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The North Sea flood of 1953 was the most catastrophic severe weather event to hit the 
region in the twentieth century, causing widespread fatalities and devastation across north-
west Europe. In the UK, the catastrophe highlighted deficiencies in coastal defenses, 
warning systems, and government disaster management. These shortcomings, combined 
with the large scale of the floods and the high death toll led to a government inquiry into 
the floods. The recommendations of this inquiry formed the basis of modern UK flood 
management and disaster policy. This paper examines the investigation into the North Sea 
flood of 1953 and highlights an early case of a government inquiry, resulting in tangible 
policy changes, which had scientific expertise at its core. This was an important step for 
the prominence of scientific experts in British society and the government’s increased 
reliance on scientists in informing policy over the coming decades. This paper shows how 
an extreme weather event can be understood and dealt with differently by the government, 
scientific experts, and the public; highlighting changing attitudes toward extreme weather, 
risk, and the state’s role in disaster recovery. 
 
Today the population of the UK is alerted to the coming of severe weather by the 
Meteorological Office’s (MO) National Severe Weather Warning Service. The origins of this 
service, which issues alerts and warnings to both government agencies and the general public 
via the media, can be traced back to a makeshift coastal warning system established in the 
aftermath of severe flooding on the east coast of the UK in late January, 1953. 
The North Sea flood of January 31st - February 1st 1953 consisted of a storm surge 
and coastal flooding which were parts of a larger weather system that not only caused 
extensive destruction along the full length of the English east coast, but also affected Belgium 
and devastated the Netherlands. In the UK, the immediate response to the flooding was ad-
hoc and largely community-led. The clean-up and aftermath has been placed within a 
narrative of resilience, with recent accounts portraying a camaraderie and an acceptance of 
natural flood events. Indeed, the sociologist Frank Furedi (2007) uses the response to the 
event to argue for the decline of a blitz spirit now no longer prevalent in British society (See 
also Baxter, 2005). Yet such narratives fail to elucidate and unpack the much more detailed 
interactions of the natural, social, and economic spheres which collided together as the sea 
breached defenses all along the east coast in 1953. 
Due to a combination of factors including the large scale of the floods, the high death 
toll, the lack of an integrated response, and subsequent political and media pressure, the 
government announced the creation of a Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding to 
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investigate the lessons to be learned from the catastrophe. The creation of this committee 
enabled the government to deal with the issues the flooding raised, whilst sating some of the 
blame being cast by political opponents and the affected communities. 
This paper first outlines how, in the immediate aftermath of the flooding whilst the 
worst of the breached sea defenses were still to be repaired, the government created a 
temporary emergency warning system, reliant on scientific expertise from meteorologists at 
the MO. I then introduce the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding, often known 
colloquially after its chair as the Waverley Committee. By analyzing the committee’s 
composition, deliberations, interim report, and final report, I highlight how the scientific 
expertise of the MO contested not only with political and economic considerations, but with 
those of other scientific experts, such as oceanographers. When sociologists such as Irwin 
(1995), Wynne (1992), and Lash et al. (1996), discuss the public understanding of science, 
they consider scientists’ role in influencing policy, stating that political decisions often rely 
too heavily on such input. Yet none of these studies consider the historical development of 
such phenomena. The Coastal Flooding Committee presents an early case of a government 
inquiry, resulting in tangible policy changes, which had scientists at its core. This was an 
important step for the prominence of scientific experts in British society and the government’s 
increased reliance on scientists in informing policy over the coming decades.1    
I will now briefly introduce the meteorological, geographical, economic, and social 
factors which came crashing together in late January 1953.  
 
The North Sea flood of 1953 
The east coast storm surge and flooding of January 31st, 1953 was the worst naturally 
triggered disaster in twentieth-century Britain. In the UK alone, it accounted for 440 deaths, 
over 160,000 acres of flooded land, 1,200 breaches of sea defenses, damage to 24,000 
properties, and the evacuation of over 32,000 citizens (Steers 1953; Waverley 1954; Baxter 
2005).2 The storm’s first casualties came with the sinking of the passenger ferry, MV Princess 
Victoria, as it crossed from Stranraer, Scotland, to Larne, Northern Ireland, at about 14:00 on 
January 31st, 1953, resulting in 133 deaths. The storm surge hit the shore at Spurn Head, 
Yorkshire, at 16:00, before progressing southwards along the east coast of England, causing 
a further 307 deaths. As can be seen in figure one, of the deaths, 216 (70%) occurred in five 
main clusters: Mablethorpe and Sutton on Sea (16 dead), Hunstanton and Snettisham (65 
dead), Felixstowe and Harwich (over 40 dead), Jaywick (37 dead), and Canvey Island (58 










































Figure 1: The extent of the flooding on the East Coast- 1st February 1953 (black), with the 
five main areas where deaths occurred highlighted (yellow). 
(Hall 2011, 387. Adapted from Steers 1953 © John Wiley & Sons) 
 
Despite the significant lag time between the first landfall at Spurn Head, and 
communities like Canvey Island in Essex, further down the coast, who were not inundated 
until 01.10 on February 1st, no direct public warnings were issued, and each community dealt 
with the deadly deluge independently (Hall 2011). Late on the 31st the MO issued a warning 
to the Thames River Board under the Thames surge warning system, established after the 
Thames floods of 1928, which was passed on to the BBC via the police. Anyone still awake 
and listening to the radio at midnight was unassumingly advised of “an exceptionally high 
tide in the River Thames and Medway” the following morning (The Times 1953a, 6). The 
spring tide in fact combined with an extreme extratropical cyclone, producing tides two 
metres above forecasts, and waves of up to 4.9 metres (Carlsson-Hyslop 2010). 
Central government was slow to react to the flooding, with each community left to 
deal independently with the unfolding situation. Much of the immediate rescue work was 
carried out by local authorities, communities, and military servicemen, both British and 
American, based in the afflicted areas. Although the flooding only directly affected a 
relatively small proportion of Britain and its population, the government declared it a national 
disaster, and in the weeks that followed, a large national outpouring of camaraderie emerged 
(Hall 2011).3  The Lord Mayor of London established a National Flood and a Tempest 
Distress fund that was to help those worst affected, and within a week it had raised £125,000, 
and received donations of clothing, bedding, and other sundries from all over the UK (Risk 
Management Solutions 2003; Commons Hansard 1953, 1665). The mass media, through 
national newspapers, BBC radio, and television broadcasts, reinforced and augmented this 
national support for the stricken regions, providing a common national narrative for the 
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flooding. Both politicians and the media evoked a wartime narrative of resilience, couching 
relief efforts in terms of a battle against nature (Furedi 2007). 
Despite this national narrative of resilience, there were a few, if somewhat tempered, 
questions asked of both the government’s preparedness for such an event, and the official 
response that followed. Whilst flood recovery was still ongoing in large areas of south-east 
England, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Herbert Morrison, raised questions in the 
House of Commons about the Conservative government’s spending on flood defenses. In 
particular, he highlighted a circular issued the previous June, which had ordered that 
improvements on the already dilapidated coastal defenses be slowed or halted completely due 
to post-war steel shortages (The National Archives (TNA), HLG 72/2). The Home Secretary, 
Sir Maxwell Fyfe, and the Speaker of the House both intervened to “prevent what is a great 
national disaster from becoming a party matter.” In response, Morrison stated that when his 
government had been faced with severe weather during the winter of 1947, the opposition 
had been happy to make political the winter’s events (Commons Hansard 1953, 1666-1668). 
Opposition and public questioning of the authorities preparedness was most 
widespread in criticisms of the lack of an integrated warning system. Without directing 
vehement blame toward individuals or departments within the government, politicians, 
newspapers, and regional figures such as coroners and juries of inquests into the deaths caused 
by the flooding all asked questions about a lack of warnings being issued (The Guardian, 
1953, 2; The Felixstowe Times  1953, 3; Baxter 2005, 1307; Carlsson-Hyslop 2010, 233). 
The Government was quick in attempts to curb such criticism and whilst it absolved its 
responsibility for a lack of warning, in a clever political sleight of hand, the Home Secretary 
stated that it would do what previous governments had failed to do, and make it a priority to 
investigate the devising of such a warning system (Commons Hansard, 1953, 1847). 
Although significant these criticisms, aired whilst the tragedy of events were still 
unfolding, remained at the periphery of both political and media coverage of the flooding.  
The majority of discussion in these areas emphasized the exceptional natural forces of the 
storm surge, and the developing battle with the forces of nature to which the nation need unite 
to defeat. Yet however peripheral, questions aired about flood defenses, warning systems, 
and response, concerned the government enough for officials to take action.  
On February 17th, 1953, Maxwell-Fyfe proposed the formation of a committee “to 
consider what long-term measures should be taken to guard against a recurrence of flooding” 
(TNA, CAB 128/26). He was clear to state that the committee was to ensure that measures 
did not go too far, as this scale of event had only “occurred 3 times in 1,000 y[ea]rs” (TNA, 
CAB 195/11). Whilst the proposal for a committee was a direct response to both the scale of 
events and the questions it raised, the Home Secretary saw the use of a departmental 
committee as a key mediating process to place response to the disaster within the calculable 
realms of science, engineering, and above all, economics.    
The Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding was formally appointed on April 
28th, 1953 (Commons Hansard 1953, 1474; Waverley 1954, 2-3). Two reviews had recently 
examined the problem of coastal flooding and erosion: a Royal Commission from 1906-1911 
and a 1951 Advisory Council on Scientific Policy. Both had resulted in no tangible political 
outcomes. The creation of the Coastal Flooding Committee highlights how a disaster can act 
as a catalyst for public policy development (Butler and Butler 1987; TNA, CAB 124/2634). 
The complete dislocation and collapse that the extensive flooding caused focused the public, 
business, and most importantly, politician’s minds on the problem of coastal defense.   
To understand the governments’ decision to create a departmental committee after the 
flood we must first consider the use of investigatory committees in British politics in a wider 
context.  
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Committees in Disaster Events 
Although a broad array of advisory committees are used in the UK, most fit into one 
of two distinct groups: 
1 Standing committees, who have an ongoing remit and mandate, to give advice on 
such matters as referred to them on a generally defined subject, 
2 and ad-hoc committees, who usually operate within a certain time frame, to carry 
out a specific mandate, often in response to a trigger event. Royal Commissions, 
departmental committees, tribunals of inquiry and public inquiries most commonly 
fall into this category (Butler and Butler 1987, 293-305).  
Whilst today a form of investigatory committee post disaster is commonplace in 
most developed nations, in the post-war period the creation of such an inquiry was not an 
automatic government response to weather-related disasters (see Brown 2009, chapter 4 for 
a US perspective on the history of government advisory committees). While the committee 
created in 1953 built on the precedent of a smaller group that had investigated flooding on 
the River Thames in 1928, other recent events, such as widespread flooding in 1947, received 
no such formal inquiry (Gibbon 1928). Even in the aftermath of the Great Smog, which 
caused approximately 4,000 deaths across London in December 1952, there was delay in the 
formation of an investigatory committee (Carlsson-Hyslop 2010).  
The specific type of review undertaken by the government, whether departmental 
committee, public inquiry, or closed cabinet review, varied on a case–by-case basis. After the 
riverine floods which followed the winter of 1947, whilst there was no departmental inquiry, 
public inquiry, independent report, or Royal Commission, the government did liaise 
extensively with the flooded river’s Catchment Boards. The Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisheries presented a comprehensive memorandum based on this liaison to the cabinet, 
dealing with the floods and their long-term policy implications in detail (TNA, CAB 129/19). 
In reality, this memorandum differed only in its scale from reports presented by the more 
official routes of inquiry listed above, yet the government came under much criticism for not 
adopting a more transparent, formal method of inquiry (Commons Hansard 1947, 1344-
1368). An editorial opinion piece in Nature in August 1953, questioned the differing response 
to recent natural disaster events, contrasting the coastal flooding of 1953, the London smog 
of 1952, and the localized but catastrophic riverine flooding in Lynmouth, Devon in 1952. It 
highlighted that whilst the two flood events had prompted public relief funds, the London 
smog disaster had not, despite its death toll being an order of magnitude greater. More 
interestingly, it went on to state that whilst the two larger-scale events (smog and coastal 
flood) had instigated ongoing investigations, the smaller, but more frequently occurring 
riverine flooding, had received only a local inquiry (Nature 1953, 263). 
In events that are labelled as disasters, there are many varying response mechanisms, 
with the exact nature of the disaster and its cultural context informing decisions politicians 
and civil servants make. Whilst for flooding events an inquiry may not always be a foregone 
conclusion, in events which are perceived as being anthropogenic, such as the smog of 1952 
the more prominent human agency means inquiries are commonplace.4 Thick smog’s caused 
by atmospheric pollution were common across industrial regions of the UK throughout the 
early twentieth century. However, despite the obvious anthropogenic component, in 
December 1952 it was the specific meteorological conditions over London which resulted in 
the severity, persistence, and therefore ultimately the cost to human life of the Great Smog 
(Whitehead 2009, 142-148). Just as we should understand the Great Smog of 1952 as a 
combination of natural and anthropogenic causes, in itself an extreme weather event, so too 
we can view the floods of 1953 as the collapse of a series of combining, interacting human 
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and natural elements. Even within formats of investigation which have a formal structure to 
them, such as public inquiries, there is large variation in their delivery, as the chairmen of 
inquests and inquiries have significant flexibility in how they interpret their role. Such 
diversity of interpretation can blur the apportioning of responsibility and often does not help 
the recovery of those affected (McLean and Johnes 2000). 
The government’s decision to create a Departmental Committee to investigate the 
floods that was under the joint authority of the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, the Minister of Housing and Local Government, and the Minister of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, can be seen as an attempt to balance pressures from not only the public’s 
questions surrounding warnings and sea defense, but also from academic experts such as 
Alfred Steers, Professor of Geography at the University of Cambridge. In early February 
1953, Steers produced a report on the floods, and his recommendation for an inquiry to be 
conducted found its way to the Home Secretary, via the head of the Nature Conservancy, 
Lord Salisbury (TNA, CAB 124/2634; Steers 1953). The creation of the committee was 
typical of a rise in the use of such inquiries: by 1960, over 50% of advisory committees then 
in existence had been created since the Second World War, the majority of which were 
standing committees rather than one off investigations such as the Coastal Flooding 
Committee (Smith 1969). This rise occurred alongside broader trends in the post-war period, 
which saw an increasing emphasis on science, its interaction with the state, and its perceived 
integral role in the reconstruction phase (Edgerton 2006; Bowler 2009; Whitehead 2009). 
Whilst this trend may be evident in the post-war period when considering it at the macro-
scale, when investigating the Committee on Coastal Flooding independently, we must 
remember that it was not a pure faith in science as a problem-solver which spurred the 
government’s actions. The decision to use the non-statutory ad-hoc Departmental Committee 
rather than a Public Inquiry, under the 1921 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, meant that 
the committee would have limited power to compel the attendance of witnesses, findings 
would merely be recommendations for individual departments to consider, and they would 
not receive mandatory debate in the House of Commons (Sears and Gay 2009). Further, as 
we shall see from the make-up and deliberations of the committee, its creation showed a 
desire to marry improvements with rigorous cost-benefit analysis, using the purported 
objectivity of scientific experts to justify decisions (Carlsson-Hyslop 2010, 237). In addition 
the Coastal Flooding Committee was given no remit to find fault or apportion blame for the 
devastation that occurred on January 31st, 1953 (Waverley 1954). The format ultimately 
adopted for the inquiry allowed the government to placate the public by investigating all the 
scientific options for flood warning, defense and response, whilst spreading responsibility for 
resulting recommendations or actions over several departments.  
 
The Emergency Coastal Warning System 
Whilst the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding was to look into the 
longer-term questions raised by the flooding, in the meantime, much more immediate 
concerns remained the priority for the afflicted regions. The next spring tides were due in 
mid-February, and with over 1,200 breaches of sea defenses along the east coast of England, 
the already beleaguered population was extremely vulnerable to further flooding. As soon as 
the water began to subside, parish councils, local authorities, and River Boards utilizing 
policemen, locally based military personnel, and an astounding number of volunteers, began 
to repair the most vital of breached banks and sea defenses (Figure 2). This gargantuan effort 
from all involved saw approximately two thirds of the breaches repaired to high tide levels 
prior to the next spring tides (Commons Hansard 1953, 416). 
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Whilst regional authorities dealt with frontline repairs, central government, under 
direction from the Cabinet Committee on Emergencies, moved to maximize the co-ordination 
of repairs, minimize suffering, and ensure the safety of citizens before the next high tides.5  
The vulnerability of those in the afflicted communities was considered to be so serious that 
the Committee on Emergencies created an interdepartmental sub-committee to investigate the 
establishment of a flood warning system. In light of the long time it had taken to create the 
River Thames surge warning system after the 1928 flooding, they decided that no permanent 
coastal warning system could be created before the next spring tides, now only two weeks 
away. Instead, they focused their efforts on devising a short-term system that could issue 
warnings until the mid-March spring tides, by which point a more substantial system could 
be developed. This initiative was led by the MO, the government funded meteorological 
organization quickly reviewed present operations, the meteorological conditions that caused 

















Figure 2: A journalist captures an army of volunteers repairing a breach of the bank of the 
Great Ouse at Magdalen, Norfolk 
(Pollard 1978 ©Walmsey and Webb) 
 
The resultant emergency flood warning arrangements announced on February 11 th, 
1953, at their most basic constituted: 
1. The River Boards receiving, via the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), 
reports and data from the MO on high and low tides obtained from five harbors; 
2. The River Boards being responsible for interpreting this advice and advising the 
police if there is any threat or danger; 
3. The police being responsible for then giving warnings to the public, local 
authorities, and public utility undertakings; 
4. The police in coastal areas, in liaison with officers of the River Boards, were to 
survey current defenses to locate probable danger areas; and 
5. The BBC, on the advice of the MAF, who would be informed by the responsible 
River Board, was to broadcast at hourly intervals local flood and high tide warnings 
(Commons Hansard 1953, 417-419; TNA, AIR 2/11863). 
Senior figures at the MO had some experience of creating simple warning systems. 
Prior to these arrangements, the MO’s provision of advice or warnings on flooding consisted 
of a public service, via the BBC and newspapers on gale severity, warnings to London’s 
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Metropolitan Police when conditions in the Thames Estuary were likely to lead to an 
exceptionally high tide, and notifications to two rural river authorities when conditions 
favoring abnormally high river levels were expected. It is important to note that all the 
measures in operation prior to the floods of 1953 were situations where the MO issued alerts 
to individual bodies that had requested the information. The emergency warning measures 
operational from February 12th, 1953 extended these original isolated systems into a more 
contiguous, national-scale system, answerable to the national government. This shift is a key 
moment in the MO’s history, as they moved from a reactive state department that issued 
advice or warnings to interested parties as a helpful free service, into a proactive one that had 
a responsibility to warn all citizens at risk from expected inclement conditions.  
Whilst MO officials played a central role as key experts in these early flood warning 
discussions, they were careful not to overstate their capabilities. Whilst a flood warning 
system may have had many synergies with services the MO already delivered, they “could 
not be expected to visualize the conditions of the coast defenses along every stretch of the 
east coast.” Thus, they envisaged working in partnership with others, such as tidal experts, 
over the coming months to create a more comprehensive and robust warning system (TNA, 
AIR 2/11863). 
 
The Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding 
Whilst the initial aid, shelter, repairs, and emergency warning system for the 1953 
floods were being closely driven by the Cabinet and Treasury, the investigation into the 
disaster needed to be conducted independently. Civil servant, John Anderson, the First 
Viscount of Waverley, a veteran of several departmental committees, including the 
concurrently running Atomic Energy Project Reorganization Committee, was appointed chair 
of the Coastal Flooding Committee. Despite having Conservative connections, there was little 
debate about the suitability of Lord Waverley, he was highly regarded, had served under 
successive governments of both sides, and had no specialist knowledge on coastal flooding, 
which would, in theory, ensure his neutrality (Wheeler-Bennett 1962). The rest of the 
committee was made up of thirteen prominent experts, all who brought to the table 
specializations or experience in key areas of the investigation. In deciding the composition of 
the committee several organizations lobbied to ensure their interests were represented.  
The Hydrographic Department was adamant that the committee required a tidal 
expert to gain legitimacy in the eyes of other scientists. The department successfully 
recommended Professor Joseph Proudman, a leading tidal and storm surge oceanographer, 
who was well known to many government departments through his involvement with the 
committee that investigated the River Thames flooding in 1928. Proudman favored a 
statistical method to coastal surge prediction, an approach that had come under criticism 
especially from meteorologists, including the pioneer of modern forecasting Vilhelm 
Bjerknes, for failing to incorporate the complexity and fluidity of the atmosphere (Carlsson-
Hyslop 2010). Lord Salisbury insisted that the inquiry also include a “competent 
physiographer and ecologist,” successfully putting forward Professor Steers, the expert on 
coastal erosion who had earlier lobbied for the creation of the committee itself (TNA, CAB 
124/2634).  
The final scientific expert to be added to the committee was University of Oxford 
meteorologist, Dr. Gordon Dobson, who was selected after three other meteorologists had 
turned the position down. The Joint Secretary of the committee had clearly stated that whilst 
they thought it imperative that a meteorologist was on the committee, it would not be a civil 
servant from the MO. Once the MO learned that Dobson was to be the meteorologist on the 
committee, they wrote to inform him of the progress they had made since the floods, and of 
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their opinion that a sub-committee of meteorologists and tidal experts should be set up to 
examine how far the flooding problems are understood (TNA, AIR 2/11863). 
The insistence that meteorological representation on the committee would not be via 
an MO member of staff, seems surprising given their role in the creation of the temporary 
warning system, and the likely role they would have to play in the delivery of a more 
permanent coastal warning system. The inclusion of the incoming Director of the MO, 
Professor Graham Sutton, on the concurrently running Air Pollution Committee set up in 
response to the Great Smog of 1952, shows that there was no constitutional problem with a 
scientific civil servant being on a departmental committee. However, despite the MO’s 
exclusion the Coastal Flooding Committee still had a strong scientific presence. Prior to the 
war, similar inquiries, such as the investigations into the London floods of 1928, whilst having 
one or two scientifically-minded members on the main committee, more often placed 
scientists themselves on subordinate technical sub-committees (Gibbon 1928).  
The terms of reference of the Coastal Flooding Committee were: 
i. to examine the causes of the recent floods and the possibilities of a recurrence; 
ii. to consider what margin of safety for sea defenses would be reasonable and 
practicable having regard on the one hand to the estimated risks involved and on the 
other to the cost of protective measures; 
iii. to consider whether any further measures should be taken by a system of warning or 
otherwise to lessen the risk of loss of life and serious damage to property; 
iv. to review the lessons to be learned from the disaster and the administrative and 
financial responsibilities of the various bodies concerned in providing and 
maintaining the sea defenses and replacing them in the event of damage; and to make 
recommendations (Waverley 1954). 
 
The government asked the committee to prioritize term three, the warning system, 
so that it could be in operation prior to the winter. All relevant authorities were asked to 
submit evidence for the committee to consider, so that when the committee first sat on May 
4th, they already had a substantial body of evidence to address. Those who had submitted 
written evidence, including the MO, were then invited to give oral evidence to the committee 
and answer any questions which arose. At this early stage in the committee’s deliberations, 
each department involved in the emergency warning arrangements then in operation was clear 
to mark the boundaries of what its input into the system entailed, and therefore, where its 
responsibility to the public ended (TNA, MAF 135/341).  
Whilst the committee met regularly and discussed in great detail all aspects of their 
remit, much of the progress in terms of practical outcomes was to come from informal 
meetings, circulated memoranda, and technical sub-committees that occurred between main 
committee meetings. Of particular note is the Oceanographic Sub-Committee, formed by the 
main committee’s oceanographer, Proudman, which consisted of himself as chair, Dobson, 
Steers, and a Hydraulic Engineer from the main committee Sir Claude Inglis. This scientific 
sub-committee met the MO’s desire to create a panel of experts, albeit one on which they 
were again not represented. This exclusion led to the complete absence of the MO, the UK’s 
largest meteorological research body, from the sub-committee’s proposal for future research 
that was required to improve forecasting of storm surges (TNA, HO 325/13).6 
On June 23rd, an informal meeting between senior MO staff, and Commander 
Farquharson of the Admiralty Hydrographic Department, convened to finalize a permanent 
flood warning system based on the preliminary findings of the Coastal Flooding Committee. 
The attendees at the meeting agreed on two central tenets of the system that would 
subsequently be debated at length: 
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1. That, warnings should be coordinated from the MO’s Central Forecasting Office 
(CFO), where an Admiralty hydrographer would be stationed for the winter season 
1953-54 to liaise with meteorologists. 
2. That due to the myriad of agencies involved, warnings issued should be labelled as 
“advice,” rather than “warnings” (TNA, AIR 2/11863).     
From the initial emergency warning measures, to the evidence presented to the  
 
Coastal Flooding Committee by expert witnesses, and finally, to the above meeting 
on the warning system, MO officials were central scientific experts informing developments. 
For the first time in the organizations’ history, they found themselves central to not only the 
planning of future policy, but also the implementation of ad-hoc systems in the aftermath of 
the disaster (Hall 2012).  
However, the position of MO officials advising the Coastal Flooding Committee as 
scientific experts was contested. Whilst senior MO figures agreed on most matters with the 
committee’s meteorologist Dobson, some underlying tension between themselves and the 
tidal experts, notably Proudman, is apparent in proceedings. For example, when discussing a 
preliminary draft of the warning system, MO Deputy Director Dr. James Stagg questioned 
the use of the term “surge,” and the presentation of surge science as the accepted explanation 
for the cause of the flooding. He added that although the Dutch were aware of Proudman’s 
work they used a different theory to explain the occurrence of floods along the coast. Despite 
tensions about scientific theory and omission from sub-committees, senior figures at both the 
MO and the Proudman founded Liverpool Tidal Institute understood that uncertainty 
surrounding the theoretical knowledge of storm surges could translate into future funding for 
research at their organizations (TNA, MAF 135/341). 
In finalizing their interim report on a coastal flood warning system the Coastal 
Flooding Committee invited comment from the bodies that would be involved in the system’s 
deployment. As may be expected at this stage, much debate was about the finer details of the 
warning system, clarifying exact wording and agreeing on definitions of contested terms such 
as “surge”.7 Whilst much of the debate was pedantic, the semantics of an exact word used in 
such a report could have wide-reaching repercussions. Again, the exact responsibilities within 
the system were discussed, and under pressure, the MO changed their previous position, and 
the word “warning” replaced “advice” in the communications to be issued. Stagg justified the 
change thus: 
[W]e issue warnings for other things, warnings of gales, warnings of potato blight. 
We issue warnings to all kinds of people ... whether they are called alerts or 
warnings, so long as they are not executive orders. That is the only thing we 
distinguish between. We warn people of conditions and ultimately someone, 
whether it be the Chief Engineer of a river board or the Chief Constable transforms 
that into an executive order, to clear out or do something else, but for us it may be 
called a warning if it makes the thing clear.  (TNA, MAF 135/341) 
 
Those reviewing the Interim Report at the MO’s parent department the Air Ministry, 
with their more militarized focus, clearly understood the significance of such a semantic shift, 
and highlighted that the finalized draft needed to clearly designate “the responsibility for 
turning such forecasts into executive form.” If the Air Ministry was to accept executive 
responsibility, then the Secretary of State for Air requested that the Director of the MO be 
given “command status,” and have a clear directive on procedures (TNA, AIR 2/11863).  
In late July 1953, the Interim Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal 
Flooding: Flood Warning System was circulated amongst government ministers; it outlined 
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the steps required for the government to have in place a permanent flood warning system 
along the east coast of England in time for the autumn of 1953. In summary, its key points 
were: 
a.) the warning system should operate each winter between  September 15th and  April 
30th,  
b.) it should initially be confined to the east coast, 
c.) it should be based at the MO CFO, where a representative of the Hydrographic 
Department should be seconded for the warning period, 
d.)  on the basis of Harbour Masters’ reports and of meteorological information, 
estimates of water levels should be made at CFO, 
e.) each River Board, in consultation with other interested authorities, should decide, in 
light of its local knowledge, the water level at which it requires information from the 
CFO. When this level is likely to be reached, the River Board should be informed. 
The message should be repeated at regular intervals, giving the latest forecasts, 
f.) at the same time as the message is sent to the River Boards, it should also be sent to 
the County Police Forces, 
g.) County Police Forces should, on receiving a message from the CFO, transmit it to 
local government authorities, 
h.) the River Board should interpret the information in the light of local conditions and, 
when necessary , inform the Police that a public warning should, in the opinion of 
the River Board, be given, 
i.) local schemes should be worked out in advance in each river board area in 
consultation with the Police and the local government authorities concerned. 
 
Due to time constraints, the MO was not afforded a preview of the draft report before 
it was circulated to ministers. The committee secretary wrote to Stagg to apologize, reassuring 
him that the MO’s two main points raised in debate had been met. These were the insistence 
that daily reports were required from the specified Harbor Masters, and that further research 
into surges must be undertaken to expand on current formulas for predicting water levels. The 
inclusion of these two criteria pushed by MO senior figures highlights the importance 
attached to MO expertise by the Coastal Flooding Committee. In contrast, the MO’s 
indecision between communications being known as alerts or warnings resulted not in their 
clear definition as requested in the final round of consultations, but rather with all overt 
references to responsibility being removed completely from the Interim Report. The CFO 
forecasts or warnings to be issued to the at-risk regions were rather ambiguously referred to 
in the report as “information,” or “messages,” and the River Boards, County Councils, and 
Police were identified as responsible for local action (Waverley 1953). 
A final notable omission from the Interim Report was the use of radio and television 
to broadcast warnings, especially as BBC radio had been a core part of the emergency warning 
system set up in the aftermath of the flooding. Opposition to the use of the BBC stemmed 
from concerns such as those from Committee member and civil servant, Donald Fergusson: 
“there will have to be some interpretation put on the degree of risk…You must not have 
everybody being warned or it becomes a case of ‘Wolf, wolf!’ and becomes nonsensical” 
(TNA, MAF 135/341). Such sentiment prevailed: the Interim Report stated that the BBC 
should not be used, as it could only broadcast warnings nationally, causing “unnecessary 
alarm,” and such warnings were not effective at night (Waverley 1953).  
 
From Interim Report to an operational warning system 
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Once the Interim Report was published and had been accepted by all involved, there 
was little time to be wasted in turning its recommendations into a functioning system. Under 
direction from the Committee on Emergencies each organization involved in the 
establishment of the warning system began the process of putting in place the operational 
procedures required (TNA, MAF 222/306). By the end of August 1953, the departments 
involved had finalized their required parts of the flood warning system and issued operational 
memoranda to all relevant staff (TNA, AIR 2/11863). 
On September 15th, 1953, with little fanfare, the first truly national-scale flood 
warning system in the UK tentatively began operating for its first winter season (The Times 
1953b, 4). The first months of operation were uneventful. The first issuance of a warning by 
the MO was on October 24th and 25th, 1953, and in this instance, no public warnings were 
made. However, operational lessons were learnt; in this manner the system operated 
throughout the winter period, smoothing out operational faults and establishing clearer chains 
of communication. Whilst those at the operational end were smoothing out technical issues, 
others were still clarifying where certain executive responsibilities lay. In this first operational 
phase, not only was the discussion over responsibility for warnings still rumbling on between 
departments, but questions were also raised by several involved agencies, including the MAF, 
over who should pay for expenses incurred. In late November, the MO wrote to the 
Hydrographic Office asking to clarify some of the wording regarding responsibility in the 
MO Order that set out the workings of the warning system in detail.  Disagreement over the 
clear demarcation of responsibilities between these departments was fuelled by two fears: that 
of the questioning that might arise if a warning was not issued in time, and the possibility of 
a situation where the MO could overrule the hydrographer’s advice (TNA, MAF 222/306; 
TNA, MT 132/17; TNA, AIR 2/11863).  
During deliberations, those involved fell broadly into two camps: those who were 
happy that the division of labor in the system clearly demarcated where different 
responsibilities lay, and those who felt that a warning system should have only one 
responsible executor. Here, personal understandings about casting of blame in disaster events 
may subconsciously have played a role. While there was a limited amount of blame aired 
after the flooding of January 1953, due to the catastrophe, British society’s perception of the 
risk had been altered, and through the promise of a warning system, the population’s 
expectations had increased. 
The new warning system was considered experimental and subject to ongoing review. 
As well as the ongoing informal departmental communications mentioned above, review of 
the system was through formal channels such as the Committee on Emergencies, who 
assessed the system in January 1954 and at the end of its first operational cycle on April 30 th 
1954. The continued development of the system through this review, and subsequent annual 
interrogation, changed little of the fundamental operation of the system.8  
As the warning system was being implemented the Coastal Flooding Committee 
continued to sit, hearing further oral evidence in the consideration its other three terms of 
reference. During this period the committee received no further input from any meteorologist, 
other than committee member Dobson, and had no direct contact with the MO. 
In early 1954, the report of the Oceanographic Sub-Committee was circulated prior 
to a meeting to consider its findings. When Stagg at the MO received the report it was the 
first time he had heard of the Oceanographic Sub-Committee, the tensions with Proudman 
and the other tidal experts involved, now rapidly escalated. In expressing his anger at the 
MO’s exclusion from the creation of the sub-committee’s report, Stagg highlighted that the 
failings of similar research after the floods of 1928 had been caused by the lack of a “joint 
affair between the meteorologist and the tidal expert.” In the meeting on the sub-committee’s 
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report Stagg argued that the MO were integral to the warning system and future research into 
coastal flooding, and that the organization’s exclusion from the sub-committee and the 
research proposal was outrageous. Through Stagg’s persistence, it was agreed that the MO 
was to be consulted in the research the sub-committee had proposed, and that to ensure 
departments were not left out of future proceedings there should be a small coordinating 
departmental committee established.  When such a committee was created in July 1954, after 
the Coastal Flooding Committee’s final report was published, the MO was indeed invited to 
appoint a technical representative (TNA, AIR 2/11863). 
The episode highlights that whilst senior MO figures were more central experts in 
review of meteorological disaster in 1953 than they had been in previous extreme weather 
events, the space they occupied as scientific experts was fast becoming overcrowded. Not 
only was there an increase in academic meteorological expertise with Dobson on the Coastal 
Flooding Committee, but now subjects such as coastal forecasting, which had previously been 
considered solely the meteorologists’ realm, were in competition with another emergent 
discipline, oceanography. 
The MO’s challenged position in the final proceedings of the committee was 
exacerbated by the ad-hoc nature of a departmental committee; the lack of formulaic practice 
enabled the Coastal Flooding Committee to create a sub-committee that had no mandatory 
requirement to liaise with all necessary stakeholders. If we compare this to the public inquiry 
held to investigate the sinking of the MV Princess Victoria, caused by the same weather 
system as the 1953 floods, we see a stark difference. This inquiry required the MO to present 
evidence in a judicial setting, as is standard for investigations of large losses of life at sea. 
The longer history of inquiries into loss of life at sea meant that a clear procedure for such 
investigations existed, which consulted all of the stakeholders in an equal and public manner 
(TNA, BJ 5/274). 
Oblivious to the institutional wrangling occurring between the MO and the sub-
committee, the Coastal Flooding Committee continued to meet and on June 3rd 1954 it 
published its final report. The report was to greatly influence British flood and coastal defense 
policy; the final section of this paper briefly considers the key elements of the final report, 
and its wider implications.  
 
The Report of the Departmental Committee on Coastal Flooding 
The Coastal Flooding Committee’s final report detailed the specifics, both 
meteorological and economic, of the flood event, and explained the causes insofar as they 
were understood by the members of the committee. The report then went on, in detail, to 
discuss the committee’s findings on each of its original terms of reference, and recommended 
twenty-six actions. Most recommendations regarded sea defenses, six related to physical 
improvements, and a further five called for research into specified sea defense mechanisms. 
Included in these was a recommendation for investigation to be undertaken into the possibility 
of building a closable structure on the River Thames to protect London from coastal surges 
(Waverley 1954, 30). This was a significant development for London’s tidal defenses, and 
after Sir Hermann Bondi’s influential review of its progress in 1966, it led to the construction 
of the Thames Barrier, which was finally completed in 1982 (Horner 1980). 
The remaining recommendations aimed at clarifying, improving, and developing the 
coordination of flood defense at both a regional and national level. The report called for all 
involved authorities to review their mechanisms, and made recommendations on how future 
works should be funded. Only two of the recommendations directly affected the MO: firstly, 
that oceanographic research should be carried out as proposed by Proudman’s sub-committee, 
and secondly, that two consultative and advisory standing committees should be established 
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to ensure coordination of research. The phrase, “in each case in consultation with the 
Meteorological Office,” had now been added to the sub-committee’s report which appeared 
as Appendix B. Clear evidence that Stagg had won his final battle to secure a place for the 
MO within the British government’s expert advice structure. The committee concluded that 
the warning system, as proposed by the Interim Report and as operated through the previous 
winter, was adequate, subject to ongoing review. The report also reiterated many of the 
findings of the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy’s consideration of coastal erosion from 
1951. This earlier report had highlighted the need for sea defense research and immediate 
improvement of the most urgent areas, as well as recommending the coordination of 
interdepartmental research (TNA, CAB 124/2634). That the Coastal Flooding Committee’s 
similar recommendations resulted in tangible outcomes, unlike in 1951, is again testament to 
the catalyzing effect that disaster events have on policy (Johnson et al. 2005). 
The most notable long-term effects of the Coastal Flooding Committee and its two 
reports were: 
 The creation of the first national scale flood warning system, which in subsequent 
years, developed into the Storm Tide Warning Service, the origin and basis of 
today’s National Severe Weather Warning Service operated by the MO. 
  The reinvigoration of discussion on London’s flood vulnerability and research into 
tidal defenses which led to the Thames Barrier being completed in 1982. 
 The creation of lasting coastal defense standards not simply determined by historical 
water levels or scientific evidence, but by political pressure and a cost-benefit 
approach (See Baxter 2005; McRobie et al. 2005; Penning-Rowsell et al. 2006). 
 
We can take this last point further, for it was not just in the designation of sea defense 
levels that the committee’s report used a prototype cost-benefit analysis approach; the 
language of the whole report was pioneering in its coupling of scientific information, political 
consideration, and economic realities.9 Expanding on the style and format used by the pre-
war River Thames flood committee of 1928, the Coastal Flooding Report established clear 
avenues for scientific research and engineered improvements, in language accessible to civil 
servants, especially those within the Treasury. Populated by words such as “fair,” 
“reasonable,” and “practicable” – mainstays of risk assessment literature that emerged in the 
1970s – the report is indicative of the post-war rise in evidence-based policy-making, which 
saw successive governments rely on the findings of committees increasingly dominated by 
scientific experts (Baxter 2005, 1308; Hall 2011, 398; Penning-Rowsell et al. 2006). 
Government departments considered and implemented, where appropriate, all of the 
recommendations the Coastal Flooding Committee made.10  Previous investigations into 
flood events in both 1928 and 1947 had similarly catalyzed policy change, but in both of these 
earlier cases, the scale of such change was limited. In 1928, recommendations had all been 
restricted to the River Thames catchment, so for example, whilst a flood warning system had 
been advocated, only a rudimentary and geographically limited system was implemented. In 
1947, the dominance of agricultural land being affected by the floods, and the context of post-
war food shortages, meant improvements were largely confined to agricultural land defense 
and land drainage issues (Penning-Rowsell et al. 2006). The fact that most of the 
recommendations the Coastal Flooding Committee made were implemented over the 
following years, reinforces the idea that the scale, timing, and social context of the flood gave 
it an unprecedented influence as a catalyst for policy change in the UK (Penning-Rowsell et 
al. 2006; Hall 2011; Johnson et al. 2005). Compared to the case of the Great Smog of 1952 
and the outcomes of the Advisory Committee on Air Pollution’s Report, whose findings were 
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enacted almost wholesale in one piece of legislation when the Clean Air Act was introduced 
in 1956, we see that even the North Sea flood’s great catalyzing effect had its limits.11 The 
difference in how these two committees’ findings were acted upon again highlights the 
influence that the imagining of a disaster as natural or anthropogenic can have on its future 
management. Further, of clear influence here was the expected temporal return of such 
catastrophic events. The Coastal Flooding Committee considered itself to be reviewing an 
event expected to happen less than once every 300 years, whilst thick smog in London had 
become an annual occurrence by the early 1950s. 
Given the Coastal Flooding Committee’s terms of reference to learn lessons from 
the disaster, and its limited judicial and statutory power as a departmental committee, it is not 
surprising that the assigning of blame does not feature in the report. Not once in the report, 
or in any of the committee’s minutes and correspondence, is mention given to the circular 
issued in June 1952, which halted much-needed repair  and improvement to coastal defenses 
on account of steel shortages. Given the political issue that the Opposition had attempted to 
make of the circular, its omission from the Committee’s final report is understandable. Yet, 
its complete absence from all of the Committee’s deliberations highlights the political 
dimension of such investigatory bodies, and their potential, despite often being presented 
apolitically, to downplay or conceal important aspects of an investigation. The circular 
exemplified many of the larger issues faced by societies in their preparation against natural 
phenomena. Issued by the Minister for Housing and Local Government in light of the 
Exchequer’s call for a “sustained effort to put economy first,” the circular looked to reduce 
material outputs by halting and reducing those public works which were not urgent. The 
government, in not considering preparation for extreme weather in a coordinated and 
integrated manner, allowed a department concerned with rectifying post-war housing 
shortages to deem coastal defense one such venture. Despite widespread riverine flooding in 
1947, and limited coastal flooding as recently as 1949, a lack of recent catastrophic coastal 
storms or surges in the UK meant that an understanding of how imperative rapid repair of 
dilapidated sea defenses was to coastal communities’ safety did not prevail. 
 
Conclusion 
Through analysis of the North Sea flood of 1953 and the subsequent Departmental 
Committee on Coastal Flooding, this paper has presented an early case of post-disaster policy 
making that had scientific experts at its core. We have seen that the central involvement of 
scientists in the Committee is indicative of a broader post-war trend, in which British society 
looked increasingly toward science for answers. Yet by also considering the physical, natural 
elements of the disaster in this analysis, we can understand that the decision to create a 
departmental committee was driven by a myriad of factors and that the framing of the event 
as a natural disaster allowed the government to consider issues as scientific problems, rather 
than simply political ones. 
The Coastal Flooding Committee is an example of scientific expertise being given a 
prominent role by policy makers in the production of a report that went on to heavily influence 
British coastal defense. Yet, we have also seen that this position was not at the expense of 
other interests on the committee. The scale of the 1953 flood had occurred only 3 times in the 
last 1,000 years. Despite this, the government used the committee to ensure that the official 
response to an event that caused over 400 deaths was based in the calculable realm of science 
and mediated by economic considerations. The use of a committee after such an extreme event 
was not a given in the period. The government’s decision to use not only a committee, but 
one placed under the shared responsibility of four departments, helped dissipate direct 
apportioning of blame. 
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In the ad-hoc creation of the emergency flood warning system, where speed was 
essential due to the vulnerability of the afflicted coastline, the MO claimed a central role in 
both the creation and the delivery of the system.  MO meteorologists were important 
contributors to the initial deliberations of the Coastal Flooding Committee and its creation of 
the Interim Report. The key position the MO also took in the coastal warning system, whilst 
maybe obvious given the organization’s previous experience with other weather warnings, 
was crucial to the MO’s future, as the use of larger scale, inter-departmental warning systems 
proliferated (Hall, 2012). As it went on to not only influence subsequent flood management 
policy, but also to directly influence the remit and scope of government organizations such 
as the MO and the MAF, the Coastal Flooding Departmental Committee, created to solve 
contingent issues caused by the “triggering” event of the North Sea flood of 1953, had 
repercussions far beyond its immediate recommendations.  
The central role scientists played in the Coastal Flooding Committee fits a wider 
trend of the post-war period, in which scientists played an increasingly important role in state 
affairs. This paper has shown that not only were scientists integral to the process, but that 
there was contestation for expert status both between civil-service and academic scientists, 
and between the disciplines of meteorology and oceanography. The Coastal Flooding 
Committee was an early case of a government report on an extreme weather event, resulting 
in tangible policy changes that had scientists and scientific research at its core. Importantly, 
the committee balanced its purportedly objective scientific findings with economic and 
political considerations, in an antecedent form of cost-benefit analysis, today an integral 
component of risk management, disaster policy, and government rationale for spending. 
The North Sea flood of 1953, and the subsequent Coastal Flooding Committee, are 
imperative to our understanding of the rise of risk and blame in extreme weather events in the 
post-war period. The role the MO and other scientific experts played in the committee 
highlights the development of the state’s utilitarian view of science. The MO’s role in the 
government’s implementation of the warning system was a decisive step in its transition 
towards becoming a more public-oriented organization and is essential to understanding its 
current position as the central authority on extreme weather events in the UK. Decisions made 
in the aftermath of the floods, including the decision not to use the BBC to disseminate 
warnings, and the debates surrounding responsibility for warnings, had significant 
repercussions for the MO’s future risk-management profile. In setting up a co-ordinated 
national scale warning system, the MO, on behalf of the British government, had unwittingly 
become the managers of a risk that previously had been borne across the vulnerable 
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